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Abstract 
This paper utilizes data on physician malpractice insurance premiums and state 
tort law to analyze how physicians in various medical specialties are differentially 
affected by caps on noneconomic damages. As higher premiums put pressure on 
legislators to enact damage caps, I instrument caps on noneconomic damages with 
enactment of tort reform measures that do not affect malpractice premiums to uncover the 
effect of caps on noneconomic damages on such premiums. I find evidence to support 
that, in terms of dollars saved, physicians in high risk specialties benefit more from 
noneconomic damage caps than physicians in low risk specialties. However, in 
percentage terms, I find that physicians in all specialties essentially benefit equally from 
caps on noneconomic damages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 First and foremost, I want to thank my reader, Professor Eric Helland, for his 
tremendous support throughout the entire process of writing this paper. In addition to 
guiding me to a topic and allowing me access to some great data sources, your advice and 
comments have been an invaluable resource. Many, many thanks for working through 
this paper with me.  
 Thanks to Professor Manfred Keil for helping to keep me on track as well as all of 
your support over the years and throughout this project.  
 I couldn’t have finished this paper without the help of the Lowe Institute of 
Political Economy. Thank you for allowing me to use, and crash on a number of 
occasions, your computers.  
 A final thank you to all of my family and friends who listened to me talk about 
my thesis. I recognize that not everyone finds insurance markets as interesting as I do and 
I am grateful to all of you for sitting through my banter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. i 
Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................................... ii 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Relevant Literature ...................................................................................................................... 2 
3. Model ........................................................................................................................................... 4 
3.1 The General Model ................................................................................................................ 4 
3.2 Justification for Ignoring Asymmetric Information .............................................................. 11 
4. Data & Estimation ...................................................................................................................... 14 
4.1 Data ...................................................................................................................................... 14 
4.2 Estimation ............................................................................................................................ 17 
5. Results ........................................................................................................................................ 23 
5.1 Average Premiums as Dependent Variable ......................................................................... 23 
5.2 Firm Level Premiums as Dependent Variable ...................................................................... 31 
5.3 Discussion of Results ............................................................................................................ 38 
5.4 Limitations............................................................................................................................ 39 
6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 40 
Variable Descriptions ..................................................................................................................... 41 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 43 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 The rising costs of medical malpractice insurance have been the subject of much 
concern for the past three decades. In response to these steady escalations, state 
legislatures have passed numerous different tort reform measures, which attempt to 
reduce frivolous lawsuits and limit physician liability. A number of studies, discussed 
below, find that most of these reforms have unfortunately had little to no effect on 
medical malpractice premiums. However, caps on noneconomic damages, which limit the 
amount that a jury can award to a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case, have been 
shown to have a statistically significant effect in reducing medical malpractice premiums.  
 The purpose of this paper is to study the differences in premium reduction 
between medical specialties resulting from noneconomic damage caps, thereby limiting 
physician liability. My hypothesis is twofold: first, physicians in high risk specialties will 
benefit more than physicians in low risk specialties from capping noneconomic damage 
caps; second, in percentage terms, physicians in high and low risk specialties will see 
similar benefit from capping noneconomic damages. I find evidence to support my 
hypothesis that premiums, in dollar terms, for physicians in high risk specialties decrease 
more than physicians in low risk specialties in response to caps on noneconomic 
damages. In further support of my hypothesis, I find little difference, in percentage terms, 
in premium reduction between high risk and low risk physicians. In essence, these 
findings imply that, in response to caps on noneconomic damages, premiums in a given 
state decrease by a constant percentage for physicians in both high risk and low risk 
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specialties. However, this percentage decrease corresponds to a higher dollar decrease for 
physicians in high risk specialties because their premiums are higher to begin with.  
 I proceed as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant literature, while Section 3 
introduces a model of the medical malpractice insurance market and proposes a 
theoretical basis for my hypothesis that premiums will decrease more, in levels, for high 
risk physicians than for low risk physicians in response to reductions in liability and that, 
in percentage terms, premium decreases will be roughly equivalent across specialties. 
Section 4 discuses both data sources and the empirical model used to test my hypothesis. 
Section 5 discusses results and limitations. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Relevant Literature 
The literature on the effects of tort reform on medical malpractice premiums 
varies widely in its findings. In the early 1970’s, the market for malpractice insurance 
experienced a number of problems; an ensuing insurance crisis severely limited the 
availability of malpractice insurance as insurers left that market in response to rapidly 
increasing liability risk. In an effort to mitigate the crisis, forty seven states passed a 
variety of medical malpractice tort reform measures1. Danzon (1986) empirically 
investigates the impact of these reforms on physician liability. Specifically, Danzon finds 
that damage cap rules and collateral source reforms both have significant effects on 
average malpractice payments. She finds that damage cap laws reduce average 
                                                          
1
 Brook et al. (1975) find that all states except Mississippi, Vermont, and Virginia enacted some form of 
tort reform in the mid 1970’s.  
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malpractice payments by 23% and collateral source reforms reduce average malpractice 
payments by around 11% to 18%. However, Danzon finds that other forms of tort reform 
have no significant effect on physician liability risk.  
 Sloan et al. (1989) conduct a similar investigation, examining the effects of 
various tort reform measures on both average malpractice payments and the probability 
of being liable for a malpractice payment. They look at a number of different reform 
measures: damage caps, collateral source reform, and periodic payment reforms. In line 
with Danzon’s (1986) findings, they find that caps on damages, both total damages and 
noneconomic damages, have extremely significant and economically important effects on 
average indemnity payments; however, they also find that neither of these caps have any 
statistically significant effect on the probability of a malpractice payment. In line with the 
conventional wisdom, they find that caps on punitive damages have no statistically 
significant effect on average malpractice payments. Further, they find that collateral 
source reform lowers average malpractice payments. Finally, they find that periodic 
payment reform has no significant effect on the average malpractice payment size.  
 In a similar investigation, Barker (1992) uses statewide loss-ratios to investigate 
the effects of various tort reform measures on total liability risk. She finds that the caps 
on damages are the only tort reform measure to have statistically significant effects on 
liability risks. She also finds that strictly codifying the required standard of care has a 
beneficial effect on liability risk.  
 The mid 1980’s had a similar malpractice insurance crisis and a large number of 
states passed a second wave of tort reform measures in attempts to curb rapidly escalating 
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premiums. Whereas the 1970’s “crisis of availability” was marked by insurers leaving the 
market, the 1980’s “crisis of affordability” was marked by skyrocketing premiums. While 
Viscusi et al. (1993) find that some reforms lowered premiums for general liability 
insurance, they find that most reform measures passed during this period had little effect 
on premiums for medical malpractice insurance. They find that modifications to joint and 
several liability have a statistically significant effect of reducing premiums. However, 
they find that no other reforms (including limits on damages) have any significant effects 
on premiums.  
 
3. Model 
3.1 The General Model 
 The market for medical malpractice insurance is unusual in that, unlike most other 
types of liability insurance, firms do not experience rate, i.e. they do not factor in past 
claims history when determining premiums for individual physicians. Hence, premiums 
for physicians of a given specialty, state, and region are identical, leading to a large 
amount of within-specialty cross subsidization. Peculiarly, physicians have been 
vehemently against attempts by state legislatures and insurance companies to experience-
rate premiums.  
In this section I present a model of how limiting liability differentially affects 
physicians across specialties. Specifically, the model illuminates the medical malpractice 
insurance market’s response to enactment of liability limiting tort reform measures; 
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further, it details how these market shifts affect physicians in high risk specialties versus 
physicians in low risk specialties. My model of the insurance industry assumes there are 
only two specialties, one with high probability of being sued for malpractice and one with 
low probability of being sued for malpractice. Second, I assume that physicians of both 
specialties have identical incomes as allowing for differences in incomes does not change 
any of the conclusions. Third, I assume that, conditional on being sued for malpractice, 
expected indemnity payments are homogenous across the two specialties. This is 
consistent with Jena et al. (2011)2 who find that there are not large differences in 
indemnity payments across specialties.  Fourth, I assume that the distribution of 
indemnity payments is also identical across the two specialties. Finally, there are only 
two periods in the model. Let W1 and W2 denote physician income and physician income 
less the expected indemnity payment, respectively. Let x and y represent the initial levels 
of  and , respectively; let 	
 and 	 denote the group probability of being 
successfully sued for malpractice for high and low risk physicians, respectively. Further, 
we know that, in the absence of asymmetric information, physicians will purchase full 
                                                          
2
 Until recently, despite the tremendous amount of research that’s been done in the area of medical 
malpractice, there has been relatively little estimation of the true risk of malpractice for physicians in 
specific specialties. Jena et al. (2011) use physician level malpractice claim data to determine the relative 
risks between physician specialties. They estimate that the risk of having a malpractice claim is almost 20% 
for some surgical specialties as compared to only 2.6% in psychiatric professions. Interestingly, the median 
amount awarded to a claimant was not highly correlated with the likelihood of receiving a claim. 
Furthermore, the average amount of a malpractice payment was fairly constant across specialties. Hence, 
conditional on being found guilty of malpractice, liability risk does not differ across specialties. This 
somewhat surprising finding will be a key assumption in the models that follow in this section.  
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insurance (Rothschild Stiglitz, 1976). The absence of asymmetric information problems 
is justified in the succeeding section. Hence, at equilibrium, the levels of W1 and W2 for 
high risk physicians are given by the following two equations:  
 
     


    
     
 Hence,   1  	
  	
 
Similarly for low risk physicians:  
 
     


    
     
 Implying,   1  	  	 
Given all this, the two insurance markets for the high and low probability specialties look 
as such:  
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Point E is the level of wealth in each state without insurance, point a is the full insurance 
level of W1 and W2 for high risk physicians and point b is the full insurance level of W1 
and W2 for low risk physicians. Line EH is the fair odds line for high risk physicians and 
line EL is the fair odds line for low risk physicians.  
This model can be readily used to examine the effects of laws that limit liability in 
medical malpractice suits. One example of such a law is a cap on the amount of 
noneconomic damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff. First, note that such a change 
will have a negligible effect on the probabilities of being sued for both specialties as 
presumably a patient will still file a suit if they have been wronged and law changes have 
no effect on the intrinsic probability that a physician will make a mistake. Next, these law 
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changes will have no effect on the starting level of W1, the physician’s level of income 
without insurance. Thus, the only effect that capping economic damages will have is to 
increase the level of W2 for all specialties as their expected loss in the event of a 
malpractice suit has diminished. Further, under the assumption that the distribution of 
indemnity payments is identical for the two specialties, W2 will increase by the same 
amount for both specialties. Hence, the shifts in the two insurance markets look like such: 
 
 In Figure 2, line E1H1 denotes the fair odds line for the high risk physicians before 
a law change and line E2H2 denotes the fair odds line for the high risk physicians after a 
law change; line E1L1 denotes the fair odds line for the low risk physicians before a law 
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change and line E2L2 denotes the fair odds line for the low risk physicians after a law 
change.  
 Importantly, this shift in liability does not affect all physicians equally. The full 
insurance level of wealth, which is the intersection of the respective fair odds line with 
the 45o line, for high risk physicians has increased dramatically whereas the full 
insurance level of wealth for low risk physicians has only increased moderately. 
Specifically, we know that the slope of the fair odds line is 

, where  denotes 
specialty, and that physicians will purchase full insurance. From above, we know that in 
equilibrium the following equation is satisfied, where the i index denotes specialty:  
   1  	  	 
When damage caps are enacted y is increased by δ for all specialties as wealth 
conditional on being sued is now higher. This implies:  
∆   	 
Clearly, ∆ is increasing in p. Hence, following a given decrease in liability, physicians 
with higher probabilities of being sued have a higher increase in their wealth level under 
full insurance than do physicians with lower probabilities of being sued.  
In this model insurance premiums are the decrease in  required to set   , i.e., 
 !      . Hence, ∆ !    ∆   	. As such, I expect that 
changes in liability will have greater effects on premiums for physicians in high risk 
specialties. However, the story is slightly different in percentage terms. The percentage 
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change in premiums is given by the change in premiums divided by the premiums before 
tort reform: 
%∆ !    
∆ ! 
  $%&   ! 
  
	
1  	  	  
  

  
  
Note that the %∆ !  is independent of specialty; hence I expect that, in percentage 
terms, premiums for physicians in high risk specialties will decrease by about the same 
amount as premiums for physicians in low risk specialties. Accordingly, I expect tort 
reform laws that limit physician liability will decrease the difference between premiums 
for high risk physicians and premiums for low risk physicians, but percentage decreases 
across specialties should be roughly equivalent. Intuitively, capping noneconomic 
damages leads firms to cut premiums by a constant percentage for physicians in all 
specialties; however, this constant percentage decrease yields a higher decrease, in levels, 
for physicians in high risk specialties as their premiums are higher to begin with. 
 The model shows that in a Rothschild-Stiglitz framework physicians with a high 
risk of being successfully sued for malpractice benefit to a greater extent, in levels, from 
liability limiting tort reform measures than do physicians in low risk specialties. 
However, in percentage terms, physicians in different specialties benefit to a similar 
extent to liability limiting tort reform measures.  In the next section I will test this 
prediction using data on physician premiums and tort reform enactments by state.  
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3.2 Justification for Ignoring Asymmetric Information3 
One key potential limitation of the above model is that it ignores asymmetric 
information. Physician’s preferences for an absence of experience rating at first seems 
inconsistent with the fact that prediction that experience rating would lead to expected 
gains for the vast majority of physicians (Fournier and McInnes, 2001)4. However, by 
                                                          
3 The logic of this model follows directly from the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz show that if consumers differ in their probability of requiring an insurance payout, 
consumers are aware of their own probabilities of requiring such a payout, and that insurance companies 
are unable to tell the difference between individuals with high probabilities and low probabilities, pooling 
equilibria, in which everyone purchases the same insurance contract, cannot exist in a competitive market. 
They show that under certain market compositions (of high and low probability individuals), separating 
equilibria, whereby high probability individuals buy one contract and low probability individuals buy a 
separate insurance contract, can actually exist. Rothschild-Stiglitz further notes that in this scenario, high 
risk individuals are a purely negative externality on low probability individuals: by not revealing their 
“type” they make low risk individuals worse off without making themselves any better off. However, they 
also posit that under other market compositions, it’s possible that no equilibrium exists. Finally, they go on 
to show that their results are not entirely dependent on the assumption that individuals are fully aware of 
their risk profiles, but rather that there exists some characteristic that distinguishes the insurance 
preferences of low and high risk individuals.   
 
4 A number of other works have studied the deterrent effect of medical malpractice insurance. Fournier and 
McInnes (2001), Phelps (1978), and Rolph (1981) all find that an extremely disproportionate number of 
claims are filed against a very small percentage of physicians. All three of these studies mention that 
premiums would likely be greatly increased (to the extent of pushing them out of the market), thereby 
removing the negligent physicians from the healthcare industry. Hence, not only will experience rating 
reduce cross-subsidization, leading to relatively large decreases in premiums for the majority of physicians, 
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refusing to accept experience rating, physicians are essentially purchasing insurance on 
their insurance, which makes sense under a certain set of conditions. Consider the 
following three period model for a physician in a given specialty. In the first period the 
physician does not know whether he/she will be a high-risk individual or a low-risk 
individual and he/she has to decide at this point whether he/she will enter into one of two 
scenarios: buy insurance with other physicians of the same specialty at the same group 
rate or be differentiated by experience (again within specialty) in the coming periods and 
charged rates based on past performance. During the second period there is no experience 
to base premiums off of; hence, all physicians are charged the same group rate 
determined by their collective probability of having a claim filed against them. Further, 
during the second period each physician has some individual probability p of having a 
claim filed against them. Finally, during the third period, physicians who entered into the 
first scenario of group rates are again charged a rate determined by their collective 
probability of having a claim filed against them (leaving them with some level of wealth 
c); however, physicians who chose to allow their premiums to depend on experience have 
expected wealth of p*a + (1-p)*b, where a is his/her level of wealth under full insurance 
conditional on having a claim filed against him/her in period 2 and b is his/her level of 
wealth under full insurance conditional on not having a claim filed against him/her in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
but it will also have the added positive societal effect of removing bad physicians from the market. Further, 
Sloan (1990) notes that it’s pertinent not to go overboard with experience rating or one runs the risk of too 
much risk-classification error; he notes that one can mitigate this risk by using other non-experience 
classification criteria.    
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period 2. This is depicted graphically below in Figure 3, where E is the physician’s level 
of wealth without insurance, W1 is income and W2 is income less the expected loss in the 
event of a malpractice suit. Line EP denotes the pooled fair odds line, line EH denotes the 
high risk experience rated fair odds line and line EL denotes the low risk experience rated 
fair odds line. By overwhelmingly opting for the pooled scenario, physician’s reveal their 
preferences as such: '( ) 	 * '+  1  	 * ',, where '· denotes physician 
utility of a given level of wealth. However, this aversion to premium risk comes at a cost 
as 	+  1  	, is greater than c (Fournier and McInnes, 2001). By opting for the 
pooling scenario, physicians subject themselves to within-specialty cross-subsidization 
which results in lower expected wealth than the experience rating scenario. They’re 
willing to take this loss and buy insurance on their insurability given their risk aversion 
arising from their uncertainty as to their own individual risk probability. Hence, in the 
presence of experience rating the predictions of the model are similar regardless of the 
presence of asymmetric information.  
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4. Data & Estimation 
 The model outlined in the last section leads to an important testable hypothesis: 
liability limiting tort reform measures should decrease premiums for physicians of all 
specialties, but this decrease should be greater, in levels, for physicians in high risk 
specialties relative to physicians in low risk specialties. However, in percentage terms, 
this decrease should be roughly equivalent across specialties.  
4.1 Data 
 To test this hypothesis I compile a dataset comprising data on effective state tort 
reforms, state demographic factors, and premium data by firm for physicians in three 
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different specialties: internal medicine (a catchall for general practitioners), general 
surgery, and OB/GYN’s. The data on state level tort reform measures was compiled by 
Ronen Avraham and records the effective date of the ten most prevalent kinds of tort 
reform measures for all 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1980 to 2010. All of 
the reforms are coded as indicator variables for their effective years, hence the data do 
not differentiate between caps on noneconomic damages of $100,000 and caps of 
noneconomic damages of $500,000. It’s also noteworthy to mention that the database 
does not include reforms that were overturned within three years of passage. The five 
different variables that I use from this dataset are caps on noneconomic damages, caps on 
punitive damages, punitive evidence reforms, split recovery reform, and contingency fee 
reforms.  
My data on premiums comes from an annual survey done by Medical Malpractice 
Monitor. The survey collects data on the premium for a hypothetical policy that offers $1 
million in coverage per claim and $3 in coverage per year. The data provides information 
at the state, region, firm, and specialty level for three different specialties: internal 
medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics-gynecology (OB/Gyn’s). For example, the data 
provide us with the premium offered to an OB/Gyn in San Diego by the Doctor’s 
Company in 1995. I first use average premiums for a given state, year, and specialty as 
my dependent variable and then use premiums at the state, year, specialty, firm level as 
my dependent variable. Both specifications yield similar results.  
 I also use data from the Area Resource File (ARF), which is a comprehensive 
database of over 6,000 county specific demographic and medical variables. After 
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aggregating these data up to the state level, I use a number of different items as control 
variables: number of births, number of hospitals, number of hospital admissions, number 
of surgeries, average income, and population. The population numbers, while contained 
in the ARF, are numbers from the Census Bureau.  
 The data for all of these variables is available for the period 1993-2004. Summary 
statistics for the various variables are presented in Table 1.   
 
Table 1 – Summary Stats of Average Premiums 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES mean N sd 
    
AvgPremium_Internal_Medicine 8,051 590 5,299 
AvgPremium_General_Surgery 27,849 590 17,238 
AvgPremium_OBGYN 45,192 590 25,401 
 
   
Premium_Internal_Medicine 10,727 2,530 8,163 
Premium_General_Surgery 35,627 2,527 26,371 
Premium_OBGYN 55,599 2,526 34,825 
 
   
Noneconomic Damages Cap 0.227 612 0.419 
Punitive Damages Cap 0.363 612 0.481 
Split Recovery Reform 0.098 612 0.298 
Punitive Evidence Reform 0.647 612  0.478 
Contingency Fee Reform 0.353 612 0.478 
 
   
Population (millions) 5.443     612 6.029 
Hospitals 143.8     612 138.0 
Admissions 795,440     612 898,119 
Births 88,394     612 117,350 
Surgeries 494,280     612 481,292 
Average State Income 26,211     612 5,720 
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4.2 Estimation 
Jena et al. (2011) provide evidence that the probability of having a successful 
malpractice claim filed against a physician practicing internal medicine is significantly 
lower than the corresponding probability for both surgeons and OB/Gyn’s. As such, I 
expect that enactment of tort reform measures will have significantly greater effects, in 
levels, on the premiums of surgeons and OB/Gyn’s than for physicians in internal 
medicine. Again, I expect that, in percentage terms, enactment of tort reform measures 
will have equivalent effects on the premiums for OB/Gyn’s, surgeons, and physicians in 
internal medicine.  
 In particular, I examine the effects of caps on noneconomic damages on 
premiums across specialties. Caps on noneconomic damages should reduce liability risk 
for physicians of all specialties. Further, under the assumptions introduced in the model 
of the medical malpractice insurance market above (namely that the distribution of 
indemnity payments is identical across specialties), these caps should reduce liability risk 
by the same amount. The equation of interest is thus: 
 ./   01	(+23 · /+  /   41	(+23 · 5/  6./  
In the above equation, ./ represents medical malpractice premiums for a given state (i), 
specialty (k) and time (t); I use premiums at both the average state, year, specialty level 
as well as at the state, year, firm, specialty level. / is a binary variable indicating 
whether or not a given state at a given time has enacted a cap on noneconomic damages 
in medical malpractice cases. / are time fixed-effects and 5/ is a vector of state 
demographic factors including income, population, number of hospitals, etc. Further, I 
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allow the effects of all of these variables to vary by specialty. Notably, state fixed-effects 
are absent from this model. This absence has been necessitated by the lack of within-state 
variation of these laws over time. The impact of unobserved state specific omitted 
variable bias is mitigated5 by the fact that the model is estimated using the differential 
effect of caps on noneconomic damages between specialties and not the magnitude of this 
effect for any one specialty’s premiums. Finally, it must be noted that using firm level 
premiums as the dependent variable, there are often multiple firms offering slightly 
different rates within the same state (or even multiple firms offering slightly different 
rates across various regions of the same state). As I’m not seeking to illustrate within-
state differences, I ignore this as it can be viewed simply as measurement error in the 
dependent variable, which will not bias coefficient estimates or standard deviations.  
 The results from running a simple OLS regression on the data are shown in Table 
2. The magnitude of each coefficient is relatively small and statistically significant, i.e., 
there is no evidence for differences in premium reduction, in either levels (1) or 
percentages (2), between physicians in internal medicine, surgeons, and OB/Gyn's in 
response to capping noneconomic damages. While at first this may seem to contradict my 
hypothesis, the coefficients on Noneconomic Damage Caps for the three respective 
specialties are almost certainly contaminated by endogeneity bias. In particular, states 
with high medical malpractice insurance premiums are more likely to pass caps on 
noneconomic damages, which limit physician liability and thereby lower premiums. For 
example, Avraham et al. (2009) suggests that “[it’s a possibility] that changes in 
                                                          
5
 Specifically, I assume that state fixed-effects would merely shift responses up or down equally for all 
specialties. While I can’t test this assumption, it’s necessary and reasonable.  
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premiums prompt the passage of laws rather than vice versa.” Sloan et al. (1989) and 
Danzon (1986) both note that in both the 1970’s “crisis of availability” and the 1980’s 
“crisis of affordability” political pressures surrounding increasing liability risk prompted 
passage of tort reform measures. Given that in these two cases higher premiums certainly 
caused attempts to limit physician liability, it’s very likely that escalating premiums 
prompted legislators to pass tort reform measures in my sample period, 1993-2004.  
 
Table 2 – OLS Estimates 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Premium LogPremium 
   
Noneconomic Damages Cap -831.0 -0.00353 
 (522.0) (0.0397) 
General Surgery*r_cn 2,453 0.0267 
 (1,784) (0.0571) 
OB/Gyn*r_cn 900.0 0.0280 
 (2,202) (0.0556) 
Constant 3,414 -3.626** 
 (2,162) (1.448) 
   
Observations 1,770 1,770 
R-squared 0.654 0.741 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To deal with the endogeneity problem, I instrument caps on noneconomic 
damages with other tort reform measures which I expect to have little or no effect on 
liability risk and which, in particular, I expect would not be passed in response to high 
premiums. Rather, I view these reforms as indicative of the general attitude towards tort 
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reform measures and in that sense correlated with the passage of caps on noneconomic 
damages, which I assume are passed for the sake of limiting physician liability not simply 
as a result of general fervor for tort reform.   
The general idea behind the instrumental variables specification then is to first 
measure the tort reform climate in a given state using non-liability-limiting laws and then 
measure the effect of capping noneconomic damages, which limits liability, in the 
absence of pressure to lower premiums. The four types of non-liability-limiting reforms 
that I use as instruments are split recovery reforms, caps on punitive damages, punitive 
evidence reforms, and contingency fee reforms. Table 3 lists a number of laws and the 
states which had this law in effect at any time during the sample period, 1993-2004. 
 
 
Table 3 – Law Prevalence 
Law State 
Caps on Noneconomic Damages CA, CO, FL, HI, ID, KS, MD, MS, MO, 
MT, NV, ND, OK, OR, SD, TX, UT, WV, 
WI 
Split Recovery Reform AK, FL, IN, IA, OR, PA, UT 
Caps on Punitive Damages AL, AK, CO, GA, ID, IL, IN, KS, LA, MI, 
NE, NV, NH, NJ, NC, ND, OK, OR, PA, 
VA, WA, WI 
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Punitive Evidence Reform AL, AK, AZ, AK, CA, CO, DE, D.C., FL, 
GA, HI, ID, IN, IA, KS, KY, ME, MD, 
MN, MS, MO, MT, NE, NJ, NC, ND, OH, 
OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WI  
Contingency Fee Reform CA, CT, DE, FL, HI, IL, IN, ME, MA, MI, 
NH, NJ, NY, OK, TN, UT, WI, WY 
Illegal to Insure against Punitive Damages CA, CO, CT, FL, IL, IN, KS, MA, ME, 
MN, NE, NJ, NY, OK, PA, RI, UT 
 
 Split recovery reforms are a type of tort reform measure that mandate that a 
certain percentage of punitive damage awards are granted not to the plaintiff or the 
plaintiff’s estate, but rather to a state fund. These sorts of reforms do not affect the 
liability of the physician (and hence should not affect premiums), but rather affect the 
distribution of money after an indemnity payment has been made. However, enactments 
of split recovery reforms should be correlated with enactment of caps on noneconomic 
damages as they reflect the general attitude towards tort reform within a state.  
 The second and third instruments I use are caps on punitive damage awards and 
punitive evidence reform; the former refers to capping damages that are assessed as a 
form of punishment for gross negligence or intentional malicious conduct and the second 
refers to upping the evidence required to assess punitive damages. Firstly, caps on 
punitive damages are usually enacted to help businesses rather than physicians; according 
to The Doctor’s Company, a large U.S. insurer, “It is uncommon to see punitive damages 
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in medical malpractice cases, but it is not unprecedented.” Furthermore, a large number 
of states have laws specifically mandating that insurance companies are not allowed to 
sell insurance on punitive damages. Further, even if punitive damages are legally 
insurable many insurance policies do not cover them (McCullough, Campbell, and Lane, 
LLP).  The argument against using caps on punitive damages and punitive evidence 
reform is essentially that while these damages are by and large not insurable, either by 
law or by custom, they affect the bargaining power of the plaintiff in the case of a 
settlement, thereby increasing physician liability6. However, given the rarity of actually 
seeing punitive damages awarded in medical malpractice suits, this extra bargaining 
power is sufficiently negligible in the sense that states are not passing punitive damage 
reforms specifically to lower premiums. Under this assumption and the fact that caps on 
noneconomic damages are passed for the purpose of lowering premiums, both caps on 
punitive damages and punitive evidence reform are valid instruments.  
 The last instrument I use for caps on noneconomic damages is contingency fee 
reform. Contingency fee reform is a type of law that limits the percent of an indemnity 
payment that can be paid to the lawyer in the event that the lawyer is working on a 
contingency basis. For example, such a law may mandate lawyers may recover no more 
than 40% of the total value of an indemnity payment. The idea behind using contingency 
fee reform as an instrument is that these law changes will not affect premiums to the 
extent that they would be passed in response to high premiums. In fact, under a simple 
assumption (if lawyers take on no fewer medical malpractice cases after a contingency 
                                                          
6
 Malani and Reif (2010) find evidence that caps on punitive damages have significant effects on medical 
malpractice premiums.  To deal with this potential criticism, I re-estimate my model restricting the sample 
to states in which it is illegal for physicians to purchase insurance against punitive damages.  
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fee reform than they did before the reform), such changes will have no effect on 
premiums. The argument against using contingency fee reforms as an instrument is 
essentially that some cases will no longer be profitable for attorneys to take on; hence, 
such a reform could be passed in an attempt to limit premiums. I claim that at worst the 
effect of such a reform would be to remove just the cases with the very smallest 
(expected) payouts and hence would not be used by legislators to drastically reduce 
insurance premiums for physicians. However, for the sake of robustness I run the 
instrumental variables regression using contingency fee reforms as an instrument and I 
run the same regression omitting contingency fee reform, it does not dramatically change 
the results.  
 I then estimate the following two stage least squares regression:  
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5. Results 
5.1 Average Premiums as Dependent Variable 
As discussed in Section 4, I use two different dependent variables to test for robustness: 
premiums at the year, state, specialty, firm level and average premiums for a given year, 
state, and specialty. I first discuss the results using average premiums for a given year, 
state, and specialty as the independent variable. The first stage regressions are presented 
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in Table 47 below. The coefficients on the various law changes in Table 4 can be 
interpreted as a percentage increase in the probability that noneconomic damage caps are 
enacted for physicians in internal medicine (1), general surgery (2) and OB/Gyn’s (3). 
For each of the three first stage regressions, Specialty*punitive evidence reform is 
individually significant. Further, the instruments pass a weak instruments test for each of 
the three first stage regressions: for (1), F(12,1726) = 36.28, p=0.00, for (2), F(12,1726) = 
13.43, p=0.00, for (3), F(12,1726) = 13.43, p=0.00.  
 The results for the coefficients of interest for the instrumental variables regression 
are displayed in the first column of Table 5. All standard errors reported are bootstrapped 
standard errors to remove autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The base group for all 
of the regressions in Table 5 is the internal medicine specialty, thus all terms containing a 
dummy variable for internal medicine physicians have been removed. As such, in column 
1 the coefficient on caps on noneconomic damages represents the exogenous effect of a 
cap on noneconomic damages on premiums for physicians in internal medicine. The 
coefficient on caps on noneconomic damages is roughly -5,000, implying that caps on 
noneconomic reduce premiums for physicians in internal medicine by about $5,000 on 
average. Further, this coefficient is highly statistically significant. Of much greater 
importance, however, are the coefficients on the interaction terms representing the 
differential effect of noneconomic damage caps for surgeons and OB/Gyn’s. The 
coefficients on these two terms are approximately -7,000 and -20,000 which denotes 
                                                          
7
 Note that these are the first stage regression for the level specification. The first stage regression for the 
log specification are highly similar and the instruments pass weak instrument tests in both cases. Further, 
I’ve removed values whose coefficient was 0 and extremely insignificant to enhance readability. To ensure 
consistency all regressors were included in each first stage regression.  
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Table 4 – First Stage regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Noneconomic 
Damage Caps 
Noneconomic Damage 
Caps _General_Surgery 
Noneconomic 
Damage Caps 
_OBGYN 
    
Punitive Evidence Reform 0.316*** -0.00176 -0.00176 
 (0.0273) (0.00160) (0.00160) 
General Surgery*Punitive Evidence Reform  0.321***  
  (0.0274)  
OB/Gyn*Punitive Evidence Reform   0.321*** 
   (0.0274) 
Punitive Damages Cap 0.0504 0.000756 0.000756 
 (0.0332) (0.00144) (0.00144) 
General Surgery*Punitive Damages Cap  0.0481  
  (0.0334)  
OB/Gyn*Punitive Damages Cap   0.0481 
   (0.0334) 
Split Recovery Reform -0.00281 -0.00318 -0.00318 
 (0.0583) (0.00242) (0.00242) 
General Surgery*Split Recovery Reform  0.00675  
  (0.0582)  
OB/Gyn*Split Recovery Reform   0.00675 
   (0.0582) 
Contingency Fee Reform 0.0387 0.00387 0.00387 
  (0.00244) (0.00244) 
General Surgery*Contingency Fee Reform  0.0271  
  (0.0365)  
OB/Gyn*Contingency Fee Reform   0.0271 
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   (0.0365) 
Constant 0.199** 0.0509* 0.0509* 
 (0.0947) (0.0301) (0.0301) 
    
Observations 1,770 1,770 1,770 
R-squared 0.233 0.357 0.357 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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that, on average, caps on noneconomic damages decrease premiums by $7,000 and 
$20,000 more than for physicians in internal medicine, for surgeons and OB/Gyn’s, 
respectively.  While the coefficient on the interaction term for surgeons in not statistically 
significant, the large difference between changes in premiums for OB/Gyn’s and 
physicians in internal medicine is highly statistically significant, implying that premiums 
for OB/Gyn’s respond more to capping noneconomic damages than do premiums for 
physicians in internal medicine. 
Finally, I do a Sargan-Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions. The joint 
null hypothesis of this test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and 
that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, χ2(9) = 
21.801, p = .01; hence, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.  
The third column of Table 5 shows the same regression without using 
contingency fee reforms as an instrument. The results are almost identical. The 
differential effects of damage caps between OB/Gyn’s and physicians in internal 
medicine are still statistically significant at the 1% level. Again I test overidentifying 
restrictions, χ2(6) = 16.622, p = .01. While I believe that the inclusion of contingency fee 
reforms as an instrument is appropriate given the arguments above, the results do not 
change significantly when it is excluded as an instrument.  
These results provide evidence for part of the initial hypothesis: caps on 
noneconomic damages, which mitigate physician liability risk, will have greater effects 
on premiums for physicians in high risk specialties (OB/Gyn’s) relative to physicians in 
low-risk specialties (internal medicine).
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Table 5 – IV Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AvgPremium LogAvgPremium AvgPremium LogAvgPremium 
     
Noneconomic Damages Cap -4,989*** -0.609*** -5,397*** -0.667*** 
 (1,739) (0.158) (1,636) (0.168) 
General Surgery*Noneconomic Damages Cap -6,667 -0.0519 -6,433 0.0164 
 (4,609) (0.224) (4,620) (0.231) 
OB/Gyn*Noneconomic Damages Cap -19,760*** -0.0723 -19,566*** -0.0367 
 (6,879) (0.218) (6,386) (0.239) 
Constant 7,334*** -3.943** 7,502*** -1.128 
 (2,711) (1.622) (2,523) (1.112) 
     
Observations 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 
R-squared 0.577 0.661 0.575 0.654 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  Next, I ran the same regressions using a log specification to test whether the same 
differential effects were observed in percentage terms. These two regressions are 
presented in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5, corresponding to the specification including 
contingency fee reforms and excluding contingency fee reforms, respectively. In 
accordance with my hypothesis, there is little evidence that there is a differential effect of 
damage caps between surgeons or OB/Gyn’s and physicians in internal medicine in 
percentage terms. The percentage effects of damage caps range from decreasing 
premiums by 46% to 50%; however, there is no statistically significant difference of this 
effect between surgeons or OB/Gyn’s and physicians in internal medicine. Finally, I ran 
tests of the overidentifying restrictions: for (2) χ2(9) = 24.764, p = .00, and for (4) χ2(6) = 
18.368, p = .01.  
  I noted in the previous section that there are arguments for why both 
punitive evidence reforms and caps on punitive damages are not good instruments. 
However, there are 17 states that have laws specifically prohibiting insurance companies 
from insuring physicians against punitive damages. As such, I run the same instrumental 
variables regressions as above, omitting contingency fee reforms and restricting the 
sample only to states that prohibit insuring against punitive damages. The IV estimates 
for the level (1) and log (2) specifications are shown in Table 6 below8. The results are 
similar to the unrestricted sample - the differential effects of damage caps between 
OB/GYN’s and physicians in internal medicine are slightly higher, but are still 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, I run Sargan-Hansen tests on the 
                                                          
8
 First stage regressions aren’t shown but all first stage regressions passed weak instrument tests.  
30 
 
overidentifying restrictions, for (1) χ2(6) = 9.771, p = .13, and for (4) χ2(6) = 17.235, p = 
.01.  
 
Table 6 – IV Estimates 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES AvgPremium   LogAvgPremium 
   
Noneconomic Damages Cap -11,458*** -0.394 
 (4,394) (0.276) 
General Surgery*Noneconomic Damages Cap 1,256 -0.149 
 (7,637) (0.337) 
OB/Gyn*Noneconomic Damages Cap -26,990** -0.460 
 (10,594) (0.368) 
Constant 25,697*** -1.376 
 (7,862) (2.854) 
   
Observations 582 582 
R-squared 0.538 0.714 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 In summary, while I do not find evidence to support the claim that, in percentage 
terms, premiums by specialty respond differently to laws mitigating liability risk, I find 
evidence to support that, in levels, premiums by specialty do respond differently to laws 
mitigating liability risk. Both of these findings are consistent with the theoretical model 
proposed in Section 3. Hence, there are two conclusions worth stating here: first, limiting 
physician liability through damage caps does reduce premiums; second, in terms of 
dollars saved, physicians in high risk specialties benefit more, in terms of dollars paid in 
premiums, from those reforms than do physicians in low risk specialties.  
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5.2 Firm Level Premiums as Dependent Variable 
 Next I look at the same set of IV regressions using firm level premium data as the 
dependent variable. The first stage regressions are reported below in Table 79. The 
coefficients on the various law changes in Table 7 can be interpreted as a percentage 
increase in the probability that noneconomic damage caps are enacted for physicians in 
internal medicine (1), general surgery (2) and OB/Gyn’s (3). Importantly, the instruments 
pass a weak instruments test for each of the three first stage regressions: for (1), 
F(12,7557) = 165.13, p=0.00, for (2), F(12,1726) = 61.21, p=0.00, for (3), F(12,7557) = 
61.17, p=0.00. 
 I present the results for the coefficients of interest for the instrumental variables 
regression in Table 8. All standard errors reported are bootstrapped standard errors to 
remove autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, as well as errors correlation within groups of 
firms offering insurance to physicians of the same specialty in the same year and state. 
All four regressions are tested for overidentifying restrictions: for (1) χ2(9) = 324.4.06, p 
= .00, and for (2) χ2(6) = 169.896, p = .00, for (3) χ2(9) = 286.200, p = .00, and for (4) 
χ
2(6) = 240.793, p = .00. Again, the base group for all of the regressions in Table 8 is the 
internal medicine specialty. The results are fairly similar to the results using the average 
statewide premiums in Section 5.1. The important coefficient in this table is that on 
OB/Gyn*Noneconomic damages, which
                                                          
9
 Note that these are the first stage regression for the level specification. The first stage regression for the 
log specification are highly similar and the instruments pass weak instrument tests in both cases. Further, 
I’ve removed values whose coefficient was 0 and extremely insignificant to enhance readability. To ensure 
consistency all regressors were included in each first stage regression. 
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Table 7 – First Stage Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Noneconomic 
Damage Cap 
Noneconomic Damage 
Cap_General_Surgery 
Noneconomic 
Damage 
Cap_OBGYN 
    
Punitive Evidence Reform 0.295*** 0.00227** 0.00227** 
 (0.0141) (0.000912) (0.000912) 
General Surgery*Punitive Evidence Reform 0.000775 0.289*** 3.34e-05 
 (0.0199) (0.0142) (0.00109) 
OB/Gyn*Punitive Evidence Reform 0.000675 2.79e-05 0.289*** 
 (0.0199) (0.00109) (0.0142) 
Punitive Damages Cap -0.0415*** -0.000466 -0.000469 
 (0.0158) (0.000861) (0.000861) 
General Surgery*Punitive Damages Cap -0.000473 -0.0406** -1.93e-05 
 (0.0223) (0.0158) (0.00104) 
OB/Gyn*Punitive Damages Cap -0.000329 -1.18e-05 -0.0405** 
 (0.0223) (0.00104) (0.0158) 
Split Recovery Reform -0.0624** -0.00355** -0.00355** 
 (0.0258) (0.00175) (0.00175) 
General Surgery*Split Recovery Reform -0.000785 -0.0525** -3.50e-05 
 (0.0362) (0.0259) (0.00167) 
OB/Gyn*Split Recovery Reform -0.000835 -3.74e-05 -0.0525** 
 (0.0362) (0.00167) (0.0259) 
Contingency Fee Reform -0.0237 0.00219 0.00219 
 (0.0187) (0.00153) (0.00153) 
General Surgery*Contingency Fee Reform 0.00208 -0.0283 9.13e-05 
 (0.0260) (0.0186) (0.00127) 
OB/Gyn*Contingency Fee Reform 0.00188 8.09e-05 -0.0285 
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 (0.0260) (0.00127) (0.0186) 
Constant 0.179*** 0.0457** 0.0457** 
 (0.0625) (0.0227) (0.0227) 
    
Observations 7,601 7,601 7,601 
R-squared 0.410 0.516 0.515 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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is roughly -11,000, implying that OB/Gyn’s premiums decrease by around $11,000 more 
than physicians in internal medicine when caps on noneconomic damages are enacted. 
Further, this coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. I also run the same IV 
regression omitting contingency fee reform in (2) and find that the estimates are 
relatively similar, importantly, the differential effect between OB/Gyn’s and physicians 
in internal medicine is still statistically significant and economically important.  
Next, I ran the same regressions using a log specification to test whether the same 
differential effects were observed in percentage terms. These two regressions are 
presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8, corresponding to the specification including 
contingency fee reforms and excluding contingency fee reforms, respectively. In (3) I 
find no evidence for differential effects of capping noneconomic damages between 
specialties; however, in (4) I find that physicians in internal medicine actually benefit 
more in percentage terms than surgeons and OB/Gyn’s.  While the percentage differences 
between physicians in internal medicine and surgeons and OB/Gyn’s is only significant at 
the 10% level, it’s nonetheless contrary to my hypothesis.  
This second result is interesting because it diverges from the expectations of the 
model presented in the prior section. Before chocking this result up to insurance market 
imperfections, I propose an explanation for this phenomenon and a possible shortcoming 
of the model: the distributions of indemnity payments may be heterogeneous across 
specialties. Specifically, suppose that surgeons and OB/Gyn’s have normally distributed 
indemnity payments whereas physicians in internal medicine have slightly more bi-modal 
distributed indemnity payments (note that their averages must still be roughly identical). 
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This explanation makes some intuitive sense, physicians in internal medicine have a 
lower probability of being sued for malpractice, and as such it’s likely that in the event 
that they are sued, they may have committed a particularly egregious mistake more of the 
time than a surgeon or OB/Gyn. If this is in fact the case, reform measures limiting 
damages would have greater effects for physicians in internal medicine than predicted by 
the model (relative to surgeons and OB/Gyn’s). If this is in fact the case, the observed 
results that, in percentage terms, premiums for physicians in internal medicine decrease 
more than premiums for OB/Gyn’s and surgeons seems plausible. 
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Table 8 – IV Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Premium Premium LogPremium LogPremium 
     
Noneconomic Damages Cap -7,912*** -6,038*** -0.436*** -0.520*** 
 (1,559) (1,308) (0.0680) (0.0724) 
General Surgery*Noneconomic Damages Cap -687.3 -2,174 0.0809 0.162* 
 (3,951) (3,562) (0.0896) (0.0965) 
OB/Gyn*Noneconomic Damages Cap -11,138** -11,898** 0.117 0.200* 
 (5,280) (4,869) (0.0979) (0.106) 
Constant 43,045*** 37,640*** 2.682*** 2.558*** 
 (2,761) (2,827) (0.639) (0.640) 
     
Observations 7,583 7,583 7,583 7,583 
R-squared 0.525 0.528 0.678 0.674 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Finally, I both exclude contingency fee reforms as an instrument and restrict the 
sample only to states that prohibit insuring punitive damages. The results for the level (1) 
and log (2) specification are presented in Table 9. In (1), OB/Gyn’s benefit roughly 
$47,000 more than physicians in internal medicine in response to capping noneconomic 
damages. Further, this difference is highly statistically significant. Again, however, the 
effect of noneconomic damage caps is roughly the same (or slightly less for surgeons) in 
percentage terms. Lastly, I test the overidentifying restrictions: for (1) χ2(6) = 74.512, p = 
.00, and for (2) χ2(6) = 65.626, p = .00. 
 
Table 9 – IV Estimates 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Premium LogPremium 
   
Noneconomic Damages Cap -29,844*** -1.858*** 
 (4,599) (0.137) 
General Surgery*Noneconomic Damages Cap -2,651 0.335* 
 (8,171) (0.183) 
OB/Gyn*Noneconomic Damages Cap -46,994*** 0.128 
 (10,938) (0.177) 
Constant 113,037*** 10.47*** 
 (7,614) (2.389) 
   
Observations 3,145 3,145 
R-squared 0.408 0.543 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Critically, using premiums at the firm level as the dependent variable and using 
premiums at the state average level yield highly similar results.  
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5.3 Discussion of Results 
 In support of my hypothesis, I find that in levels premiums decrease in response 
to caps on noneconomic damages more for OB/Gyn’s, a relatively high risk specialty, 
than for physicians in internal medicine, a relatively low risk specialty. This finding is 
fairly robust to specification as this result holds true using both firm level premiums and 
state average premiums as the dependent variable. Further, the result holds excluding 
contingency fee reforms as an instrument and by restricting the sample to only states that 
prohibit physicians insuring themselves against punitive damages. In the case of the 
restricted sample we know that caps on punitive damages and punitive evidence reforms 
are purely representative of the tort reform climate as legislators will not pass these 
reforms in an effort to reduce premiums; the fact that the results do not change with this 
restricted sample is therefore evidence that both punitive evidence reform and caps on 
punitive damages are, in fact, valid instruments.  
 In further support of my hypothesis, I find that, in percentage terms, premium 
decreases in response to caps on noneconomic damages for OB/Gyn’s and surgeons, both 
high risk specialties, are not statistically different than the corresponding decreases for 
physicians in internal medicine. This finding is also consistent with the predictions of the 
model presented in Section 3. However, under some specifications, I find that premiums 
actually decrease more in percentage terms for physicians in internal medicine than for 
OB/Gyn’s and surgeons. I surmise that these departures from the model’s predictions 
may occur due to different distributions of indemnity payments for physicians in these 
various specialties.  
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5.4 Limitations 
 There are a number of limitations to this study; I will briefly discuss a few of 
them here. The first limitation is the model specification. The ideal specification to test 
the hypothesis would be to use a panel dataset and look at the effect of changes in laws 
on the premium difference by specialty. However, this is not possible for two separate 
reasons: 1) it likely takes insurance companies more than a year to accurately gauge (and 
reflect in offered premiums) the actuarial effects of a given reform measure10, 2) a lack of 
within-state variation. The total number of changes in laws around caps on noneconomic 
for the sample period of 1993-2004 is less than 30. This lack of within-state variation also 
prohibited the use of state fixed-effects in the instrumental variable specification11. The 
second limitation is the fact that we cannot account for differences within a specific law 
type, for example all caps on noneconomic damages are coded equivalently (as dummy 
variables equal to 1) whereas the size of the specific cap can vary somewhat widely by 
state, ranging from $250,00 to $690,000 during the time period from 1993-2004. 
Similarly, different forms of contingency fee reform and punitive evidence reform are not 
accounted for in the data. I don’t take these differences into account, a potential 
shortcoming of my model.  
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 In his database of state law tort reforms, Avraham (2011) does not consider reforms that were overturned 
within three years of enactment. 
11
 However, as argued above, I don’t see this lack of state fixed-effects as biasing my analysis.  
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6. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the effects of capping noneconomic damages, a liability-
limiting tort reform measure, on malpractice insurance premiums for physicians in 
different medical specialties. After providing a theoretical basis for my hypothesis, I test 
for differences in premium changes in response to enactment of noneconomic damage 
caps. Specifically, I instrument noneconomic damage caps with other non-liability 
limiting tort reform measures to measure the effect of damage caps in the absence of 
political pressure to reduce physician liability. 
I find evidence to support my hypothesis that, in levels, medical malpractice 
premiums for physicians in high risk specialties decrease more in response to enactment 
of caps on noneconomic damages than do premiums for physicians in low risk 
specialties. Further, I find some evidence to support my hypothesis that, in percentage 
terms, premium decreases in response to enactment of noneconomic damage caps should 
be roughly equivalent across specialties. Hence, in response to caps on noneconomic 
damages, premiums decrease by a constant percentage for all physicians; however, this 
percentage decrease corresponds to a larger decrease, in dollar terms, for physicians in 
high risk specialties because their premiums were higher to begin with. Under some 
specifications, I find that, in percentage terms, premiums actually decrease more for 
physicians in internal medicine, a relatively low risk specialty, than for OB/Gyn’s and 
surgeons, relatively high risk specialties. While this result is only weakly statistically 
significant, I surmise that this difference arises from differences in distributions of 
indemnity payments by physician specialty.  
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Understanding the extent to which physicians of different specialties differentially 
benefit from liability-limiting tort reform measures not only provides a deeper 
understanding of the workings of the medical malpractice insurance market, but also 
offers insight into why physicians of different specialties might be differentially 
incentivized towards inciting and supporting tort reform.    
 
Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Premium The premium charged, by a given firm for a particular state, region, and specialty for a 
policy offering $1 million in coverage per incident and $3 million in coverage per year.  
AvgPremium AvgPremium is the arithmetic average of Premium for a given state and year.  
Specialty Specialty describes to whom a given premium is offered. Specialty takes on three 
values: OB/Gyn, General Surgery, or Internal Medicine.  
Noneconomic 
Damages Cap 
Noneconomic Damages Cap is equal to 1 if a state has enacted caps on noneconomic 
damages and 0 otherwise. 
Punitive 
Damages Cap 
Punitive Damages Cap is equal to 1 if a state has enacted caps on punitive damages 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Split 
Recovery 
Reform 
Split Recovery Reform is equal to 1 if a state has enacted split recovery reform and 0 
otherwise. 
Punitive 
Evidence 
Reform 
Punitive Evidence Reform is equal to 1 if a state has enacted punitive evidence reform 
and 0 otherwise. 
Contingency 
Fee Reform 
Contingency Fee Reform is equal to 1 if a state has enacted contingency reform and 0 
otherwise. 
Population Population of a given state. 
Hospitals Number of hospitals in a given state. 
Admissions Number of hospital admissions in a given state. 
Births Number of recorded births for a given state. 
Surgeries Number of surgeries performed in a given state 
Average 
State Income 
Average personal income for a given state. 
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